chological experiment. Similarly, we need greater recognition that the sources of evidence used to support a conclusion vary in their validity (e.g., the conclusions drawn from self-report have a validity different to conclusions drawn from direct observation), and that the causes of the behavioral outcomes we care about are complex and multifaceted. The final constraint is the tendency to attribute psychological phenomena to brains, rather than the person or animal as a whole, which leads to the assumption that such psychological states are natural kinds that are decisively located in the brain.

Throughout the book, Kagan marshals a wide variety of empirical evidence to illustrate each of these points, and his case is convincing. However, there is little in the way of synthesis (rather, there is a relentless piling on of example after example) nor any suggestion of how we could reconceptualize psychology in ways that would make these issues more salient. Thus, while the plea for a more inductive approach is well taken, there is also a case to be made for a stronger theoretical foundation to modern psychology. Context, for example, may be key because psychological phenomena are better viewed as inherently relational: distributed across brain, body, and environment, rather than viewed as confined to the brain alone. This criticism aside, this cogent, well-motivated volume provides the means to improve the quality of psychological science, and deserves the widest readership possible.

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How Humans Cooperate: Confronting the Challenges of Collective Action.

By Richard E. Blanton, with Lane F. Fargher. Boulder (Colorado): University Press of Colorado. $110.00 (hardcover); $34.95 (paper). xi + 423 p.; ill.; index. ISBN: 978-1-60732-513-0 (hc); 978-1-60732-616-8 (pb); 978-1-60732-514-7 (eb). 2016. This volume appears alongside daily headlines lamenting that humans are not cooperating. The book opens by asking an important question: “How will humans decide to address today’s ‘Grand Challenges’ of resource depletion, climate change, ethnic and religious conflict, and natural and man-made disasters?” (p. 3).

The authors, Richard Blanton and Lane Fargher, believe we do not understand cooperation, largely because evolutionary psychologists, blinded by their “Darwin adoration” (p. 18), have bewitched us into thinking that cooperation arises spontaneously from our evolved social, “groupish” nature as, for example, E. O. Wilson argues in The Social Conquest of Earth (2012. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation). The authors counter that viewing cooperation as “natural” overlooks the role of cultural factors in promoting collective behaviors.

After a chapter that succinctly—perhaps too succinctly—summarizes the limitations of evolutionary psychology, the bulk of the volume is devoted to a wide-ranging examination of how various factors, including intentionally and spontaneously developed institutions and behaviors, have promoted collective action. The authors present a statistical analysis of some 30 widely disparate cultures—ancient Athens, the Ming dynasty, the Aztecs, medieval Europe—at widely separate but particular times when beneficial collective action surged. This ambitious and occasionally bewildering anthropological survey forms the basis for the authors’ thesis that collective action is best understood via an empirical examination of when it surged, rather than attributing it to natural instincts that arise out of our evolved natures.

They find, for example, that collective action grows alongside an egalitarian ethic, in which the state is understood as a collection of people rather than the expression of a monarch or a deity. Collective action was enhanced by a decline in the early medieval belief that the temporal world did not matter—a development that increased respect for common people, such as farmers, whose labors were physical rather than spiritual. It correlated, curiously, with the emergence of naturalism in art, which portrayed leaders more authentically as “ordinary.” It correlated with truthfulness and accountability on the part of leaders. It was enhanced by the growth of markets, where enormously complicated systems developed, with staggering consequences. By teasing out statistical correlations between events in disparate cultures Blanton and Fargher argue for the superiority of an empirical science of collective action, in opposition to the “biomathematical” approach of evolutionary psychologists that, although theoretically rigorous, is sometimes not well-grounded in observation.

How Humans Cooperate, despite its occasional polemic tone, offers a valuable corrective and it is my hope that the book will encourage dialogue between the presently uncooperative camps of “collective action theorists” and “evolutionary psychologists,” highlighted on page 3. As someone in neither of those camps, however, I was disappointed that the book never returned to the “Grand Challenges”—climate change, ethnic conflict—it highlighted as the reason why we need a better understanding of collective action in the first place.

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