characters exhibit typical human aspects as well. An in-depth analysis of this series could have—and should have—formed an entire chapter.

Tahmahkera does spend a chapter analyzing and situating the Indian “healer” on the long-running animated sitcom *King of the Hill* (Fox, 1997–2010), explaining how the actor who voiced the character John Redcorn (Jonathan Joss, of Comanche and White Mountain Apache descent) pushed the show’s writers and producers to expand not only the character but the range of identities that Indians could assume. Tahmahkera could have brought this kind of detail and insight to bear on *Northern Exposure* and others as well.

It is not clear up front what Tahmahkera intends to demonstrate: his thesis should have been more clearly summarized early in the study and then adhered to. There is a good deal of text throughout that is only vaguely related to his main argument. Some of his not-so-relevant musings seem like filler, which is unnecessary considering the trove of available material Tahmahkera could have examined and the expertise he employs in the detailed readings he does undertake. Tahmahkera’s writing style occasionally veers toward the dense and jargon-laden; hence, the book is not recommended for undergraduates.

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*The Divided Dominion: Social Conflict and Indian Hatred in Early Virginia.*

In *The Divided Dominion*, Ethan A. Schmidt seeks to illustrate a common thread in the first century of English colonization in Virginia, namely the popular appeal and impact of violence toward Indians. The brutal race war against Virginia’s Indians in what came to be known as Bacon’s Rebellion was not a sudden anomaly, he argues. It was the result of decades of Virginia elites unwittingly giving sanction to the killing of Indians for immediate gains. Though the rebellion is often thought of as equal parts taxpayer revolt, uprising by upper-class men frozen out of the patronage system, and Indian war, Schmidt concludes that the murder of Indians was not simply “an unimportant symptom of Bacon’s Rebellion . . . [but] the rebellion’s primary cause and its ultimate goal or program” (p. 2).

Virginia’s settlers were taught repeatedly during the Anglo-Powhatan wars of 1609–1614 and 1622–1632 that the killing of Indians, and the resulting expropriation of their lands, benefitted white Virginians generally. It provided more lands for tobacco cultivation and greater (supposed) security. Further, elites recognized an opportunity to build an even more hierarchical and (for them) beneficial society on the backs of the Indian dead. Only in the middle of the seventeenth century, under the leadership of Governor Sir William Berkeley, would elites seek to rein in the homicidal urges

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of their social inferiors. By then, however, common Virginians had come to see unpunished brutality toward Native peoples as a right they refused to cede.

Students of early Virginia, especially of Bacon’s Rebellion, might, at first glance, feel Schmidt is providing little new information. That would be a mistake. While the basic events and people are relatively well known, the interpretive angle is the real contribution here. The deceivingly simple narrative is one of three competing visions for how Virginia’s society should function: those of elite whites, non-elites, and the Algonquians. It becomes quite clear that they all tended to misunderstand their counterparts culturally, particularly when it came to the use of violence. When Opechancanough ordered a massive attack on the colonists in 1622, his aim was likely not genocidal. As punishment for their failure to act as a subordinate tribe, he wanted to wither their warrior population and intimidate the survivors into compliance. “His failure to follow up on the attack [of 1622] shows that the mamanatowick [Chief] still perceived the Anglo-Indian relationship in Algonquian terms” (p. 77).

When colonists responded by attacking any Powhatans they could find, including those who had no role in the massacre, white elites realized the “potential [for this] to be interpreted as blanket permission for violent campaigns against any and all Indians. Though this hatred of all Indians represented a rather uncontrollable weapon, its effectiveness could not be argued” (p. 79). Desperate to defeat the Powhatans, elites sanctioned such indiscriminate killing. When Virginians occupied razed villages and distributed the land among themselves, it fostered an assumption “that extermination represented the most effective policy of dealing with Indians [and] that all colonists would have unfettered access to all lands gained from such a policy” (p. 83). After the re-establishment of peace in 1632, elites sought to reclaim their monopoly on violence, finding it more useful to push Natives around than to wipe them out. By now, however, the murder genie was well out of the bottle.

After the Powhatans’ last great assault on Jamestown in 1644, it became increasingly apparent that common Virginians would not be denied their lust for Indian blood. When the elderly Opechancanough was captured, Berkeley sought to send him to London for trial. But one of his jailers felt such entitlement and immunity from punishment that he shot the old man to death of his own accord. Indians had no rights he was bound to respect. Yet Berkeley and his General Court repeatedly sided with Indians in their suits against colonists in the 1650s and 1660s. One prominent Eastern Shore settler had been shorn of his civil and military duties—costing him prestige as valuable as coin—simply because Indians had complained about him. Thus, a few years later, when Nathaniel Bacon was cajoled into calling for a genocidal commission against Indians—and leading a rebellion when denied—he had widespread support from both the working class and elites who were not among the governor’s favorites.

In the lynchpin of his argument, Schmidt hammers home that while there had long been mutinous sentiments in Virginia, only the cause of murdering Indians generally and taking their lands “could maintain the brief unity forged across all
ranks of Virginia society during 1676. The anger over taxes, political rights, and economic opportunity was not enough” (p. 180). Only when Bacon’s common followers showed more interest in plundering estates than murdering Indians would his coalition collapse. Exceptionally well-written and cogently argued, *The Divided Dominion* offers an important and disturbing take on early Virginia for students and scholars alike.

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**Diplomacy in Black and White: John Adams, Toussaint Louverture, and Their Atlantic World Alliance.** By Ronald Angelo Johnson. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2014. xv + 241 pp. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, and index. $49.95 (cloth); $24.95 (paper).

In *Diplomacy in Black and White: John Adams, Toussaint Louverture, and Their Atlantic World Alliance*, Ronald Angelo Johnson depicts an unusual moment in the racial dynamics of the Atlantic world. Between 1798 and 1801, the United States “recognized for the first time a government leader of the African Diaspora as a de facto head of state” (p. 4). Johnson seeks to portray American dealings with the Louverture regime not merely as part of the American strategy against France during the Quasi-War or an attempt to seek advantage in the Caribbean trade, but as a central part of the history of the revolutionary Atlantic. Johnson considers the impact of de facto recognition immense. It prolonged the revolt in Saint-Domingue, which led to the Louisiana Purchase, Haitian independence, and a long-term rethinking of the nature of race in the Atlantic world.

The attempt to cross racial lines required statesmen skilled in what Johnson calls “cross-cultural” diplomacy (p. 34). The first was President John Adams. Adams had negotiated with representatives of the Barbary powers while minister to Great Britain. Adams had never owned slaves, and had what might be called a New Englander’s conventional distaste for slavery. The second was Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, who is painted in an unusually heroic light. Pickering had employed African Americans while postmaster general and was considered a culturally sensitive envoy to the Six Nations of the Iroquois in the 1790s. As secretary of war, he advocated dealing honestly with the Indian tribes. Pickering was thus uniquely qualified to host a dinner with Dominguan envoy Joseph Brunel on December 26, 1798, and begin diplomatic contact. Third was Dr. Edward Stevens, who was born in the West Indies and was a lifelong friend of Alexander Hamilton. Johnson argues that Stevens has been unjustly ignored by historians. Stevens was appointed consul-general, which did not imply a political connection. Stevens was in practice a minister in full collaboration with Louverture. Both considered their partnership highly successful.

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